See how close your answer matches with this one, which earned all 9 points on the FRQ portion of the exam. You can easily substitute Supreme Court decisions (like Brown v. Board) as well as Congressional Acts for the answer provide below....
2001 FRQ on Amending the Constitution
Two formal ways of amending the constitution are having the amendment proposed by 2/3 of both houses of Congress and ¾ of state legislatures ratify the amendment. This way has happened 27 times. The second way is having the amendment proposed by 2/3 of both houses and ¾ of special state conventions ratifying , as with the repeal of prohibition.
Two informal ways to change the constitution are by using the elastic/”necessary and proper” clause or by Supreme Court decisions. The elastic clause was used in expanding the role of Congress in interstate commerce. Congress can now regulate anything that crosses state borders. Supreme Court decisions have been used to change the meaning of the Constitution like in cases where they nationalized the Bill of Rights through the 14th Amendment. The elastic clause states that congress can do anything “necessary and proper” to carry out their expressed powers.
Informal methods are used most often because it takes much less work than formal methods. A lot of support is needed to add an amendment to the Constitution. It is much less difficult to change the Constitution with the elastic clause or Supreme Court decisions.
Thursday, September 30, 2010
Saturday, September 25, 2010
Model Student Answer to 2000 FRQ
A1. One problem of decentralized power that existed under the Articles of Confederation was the lack of a national currency. With no national currency, it was hard for states to trade with one another which led to tensions. People within the states also didn’t trust the value of the state’s particular currency which led to hyper-inflation in some cases.
A2. The Constitution under Article I gave Congress the power to coin money, banning the states from printing their own. This created a national currency for all states to use.
B1. Another problem of decentralized power that existed under the Articles of Confederation was that the nation lacked a strong central government. If issues or disputes arose within or between states, there was no national arbiter to settle these problems. Shay’s Rebellion was a case study in just how weak government in the United States was at that time. A group of angry farmers stormed the local government demanding back pensions and a halt to their farms being taken away due to taxes. Who could stand up to this rebellion?
B2. As the result of Shay’s Rebellion a national military was established under the Constitution that was capable of putting down any rebellion that could threaten the new republic.
C1. Another problem of decentralized power was the lack of a Chief Executive or president. Colonial shipping was openly victim to pirate attacks by both Great Britain and France. The fact that the colonies had no national leader to negotiate shipping issues and other treaties made the United States particularly weak and open to exploitation.
C2. Under Article II of the Constitution, a Chief Executive was created giving him the power to wage war and negotiate treaties as necessary. The Founding Fathers were careful not to give this leader too much power. They infused the Constitution with checks and balances to ensure that the Chief Executive would be answerable to the people.
D1. There are tensions between centralized and decentralized powers within the United States when considering the issue of gun control. In the case of Washington DC, the federal government has overruled a 20 year ban on concealed weapons, despite the DC’s desire to keep the ban in effect. The US Supreme Court citing the 2nd Amendment, overturned state law to the protestations of law enforcement agents and the district’s mayor.
A2. The Constitution under Article I gave Congress the power to coin money, banning the states from printing their own. This created a national currency for all states to use.
B1. Another problem of decentralized power that existed under the Articles of Confederation was that the nation lacked a strong central government. If issues or disputes arose within or between states, there was no national arbiter to settle these problems. Shay’s Rebellion was a case study in just how weak government in the United States was at that time. A group of angry farmers stormed the local government demanding back pensions and a halt to their farms being taken away due to taxes. Who could stand up to this rebellion?
B2. As the result of Shay’s Rebellion a national military was established under the Constitution that was capable of putting down any rebellion that could threaten the new republic.
C1. Another problem of decentralized power was the lack of a Chief Executive or president. Colonial shipping was openly victim to pirate attacks by both Great Britain and France. The fact that the colonies had no national leader to negotiate shipping issues and other treaties made the United States particularly weak and open to exploitation.
C2. Under Article II of the Constitution, a Chief Executive was created giving him the power to wage war and negotiate treaties as necessary. The Founding Fathers were careful not to give this leader too much power. They infused the Constitution with checks and balances to ensure that the Chief Executive would be answerable to the people.
D1. There are tensions between centralized and decentralized powers within the United States when considering the issue of gun control. In the case of Washington DC, the federal government has overruled a 20 year ban on concealed weapons, despite the DC’s desire to keep the ban in effect. The US Supreme Court citing the 2nd Amendment, overturned state law to the protestations of law enforcement agents and the district’s mayor.
Friday, September 24, 2010
Happy Friday!
Hi Class,
Missed you today. Hope your Friday was productive in APGOPO. How was the reading? On Monday you will have the Chapter 1 Review True/False quiz. It has 39 questions. You can find it here: http://www.mtbarclay.com/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/1.2truefalsequestions.doc
Keep reading Chapter 2 to the next 10 pages. We'll begin quizzes on Chapter 2 on Tuesday. Have a great weekend!!!
Missed you today. Hope your Friday was productive in APGOPO. How was the reading? On Monday you will have the Chapter 1 Review True/False quiz. It has 39 questions. You can find it here: http://www.mtbarclay.com/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/1.2truefalsequestions.doc
Keep reading Chapter 2 to the next 10 pages. We'll begin quizzes on Chapter 2 on Tuesday. Have a great weekend!!!
Thursday, September 23, 2010
Reading for Tomorrow
Tomorrow I will take the day off. I've been fighting a cold/flu for the past few days. Me and Netflix have a date with destiny....As for you guys, I will have a reading written by political scientist Richard Hofstadter--The Founding Fathers an Age of Realism. This reading should further clarify Madison's Federalist 51 and also clearly discuss the motivations and "suspicions" of the Founding Fathers in writing the constitution. It might seem lengthy to you at first glance, but is well written and much easier to digest than James Madison. There will be five questions to answer on page four of the article. Hopefully, you will have a cool sub. I told the sub that your reading should be completed with most questions answered by the end of the period. You will turn in your answers at the end of the period. The assignment will be worth twenty points, so make good use of your time. See you on Monday!
Tuesday, September 21, 2010
Federalist #51
Tomorrow, we will read in class Madison's Federalist #51. There will be a question set handed out for completion in class. If you want a head start go ahead and read it tonite:
The Federalist No. 51
The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments
Independent Journal
Wednesday, February 6, 1788
[James Madison]
To the People of the State of New York:
TO WHAT expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for maintaining in practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as laid down in the Constitution? The only answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places. Without presuming to undertake a full development of this important idea, I will hazard a few general observations, which may perhaps place it in a clearer light, and enable us to form a more correct judgment of the principles and structure of the government planned by the convention. (1)
In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others. Were this principle rigorously adhered to, it would require that all the appointments for the supreme executive, legislative, and judiciary magistracies should be drawn from the same fountain of authority, the people, through channels having no communication whatever with one another. Perhaps such a plan of constructing the several departments would be less difficult in practice than it may in contemplation appear. Some difficulties, however, and some additional expense would attend the execution of it. Some deviations, therefore, from the principle must be admitted. In the constitution of the judiciary department in particular, it might be inexpedient to insist rigorously on the principle: first, because peculiar qualifications being essential in the members, the primary consideration ought to be to select that mode of choice which best secures these qualifications; secondly, because the permanent tenure by which the appointments are held in that department, must soon destroy all sense of dependence on the authority conferring them. (2)
It is equally evident, that the members of each department should be as little dependent as possible on those of the others, for the emoluments annexed to their offices. Were the executive magistrate, or the judges, not independent of the legislature in this particular, their independence in every other would be merely nominal. (3)
But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. (4)
This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public. We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other -- that the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights. These inventions of prudence cannot be less requisite in the distribution of the supreme powers of the State. (5)
But it is not possible to give to each department an equal power of self-defense. In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will admit. It may even be necessary to guard against dangerous encroachments by still further precautions. As the weight of the legislative authority requires that it should be thus divided, the weakness of the executive may require, on the other hand, that it should be fortified. An absolute negative on the legislature appears, at first view, to be the natural defense with which the executive magistrate should be armed. But perhaps it would be neither altogether safe nor alone sufficient. On ordinary occasions it might not be exerted with the requisite firmness, and on extraordinary occasions it might be perfidiously abused. May not this defect of an absolute negative be supplied by some qualified connection between this weaker department and the weaker branch of the stronger department, by which the latter may be led to support the constitutional rights of the former, without being too much detached from the rights of its own department? (6)
If the principles on which these observations are founded be just, as I persuade myself they are, and they be applied as a criterion to the several State constitutions, and to the federal Constitution it will be found that if the latter does not perfectly correspond with them, the former are infinitely less able to bear such a test. (7)
There are, moreover, two considerations particularly applicable to the federal system of America, which place that system in a very interesting point of view. (8)
First. In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted to the administration of a single government; and the usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government into distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself. (9)
Second. It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure. There are but two methods of providing against this evil: the one by creating a will in the community independent of the majority -- that is, of the society itself; the other, by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable. The first method prevails in all governments possessing an hereditary or self-appointed authority. This, at best, is but a precarious security; because a power independent of the society may as well espouse the unjust views of the major, as the rightful interests of the minor party, and may possibly be turned against both parties. The second method will be exemplified in the federal republic of the US. (10)
Whilst all authority in it will be derived from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority. In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in both cases will depend on the number of interests and sects; and this may be presumed to depend on the extent of country and number of people comprehended under the same government. This view of the subject must particularly recommend a proper federal system to all the sincere and considerate friends of republican government, since it shows that in exact proportion as the territory of the Union may be formed into more circumscribed Confederacies, or States oppressive combinations of a majority will be facilitated: the best security, under the republican forms, for the rights of every class of citizens, will be diminished: and consequently the stability and independence of some member of the government, the only other security, must be proportionately increased. Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit. In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger; and as, in the latter state, even the stronger individuals are prompted, by the uncertainty of their condition, to submit to a government which may protect the weak as well as themselves; so, in the former state, will the more powerful factions or parties be gradnally induced, by a like motive, to wish for a government which will protect all parties, the weaker as well as the more powerful. It can be little doubted that if the State of Rhode Island was separated from the Confederacy and left to itself, the insecurity of rights under the popular form of government within such narrow limits would be displayed by such reiterated oppressions of factious majorities that some power altogether independent of the people would soon be called for by the voice of the very factions whose misrule had proved the necessity of it. In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties, and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and the general good; whilst there being thus less danger to a minor from the will of a major party, there must be less pretext, also, to provide for the security of the former, by introducing into the government a will not dependent on the latter, or, in other words, a will independent of the society itself. It is no less certain than it is important, notwithstanding the contrary opinions which have been entertained, that the larger the society, provided it lie within a practical sphere, the more duly capable it will be of self-government. And happily for the republican cause, the practicable sphere may be carried to a very great extent, by a judicious modification and mixture of the federal principle. (11)
PUBLIUS
READING GUIDE FOR FEDERALIST #51
1. What is essential to the “preservation of liberty?” How should this “be so constituted?”
2. Explain the following: “A dependence upon the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.”
3. In a republican government, which branch is the strongest? Identify three ways of “remedying this inconveniency.”
4. List two ways in which the federal system of the US “places that system in a very interesting point of view,” i.e. protects against tyranny.
*** Make sure that you know the role of the following “auxiliary precautions” in guarding against tyranny:
• Separation of powers
• Checks and balances
• Federalism
The Federalist No. 51
The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments
Independent Journal
Wednesday, February 6, 1788
[James Madison]
To the People of the State of New York:
TO WHAT expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for maintaining in practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as laid down in the Constitution? The only answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places. Without presuming to undertake a full development of this important idea, I will hazard a few general observations, which may perhaps place it in a clearer light, and enable us to form a more correct judgment of the principles and structure of the government planned by the convention. (1)
In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others. Were this principle rigorously adhered to, it would require that all the appointments for the supreme executive, legislative, and judiciary magistracies should be drawn from the same fountain of authority, the people, through channels having no communication whatever with one another. Perhaps such a plan of constructing the several departments would be less difficult in practice than it may in contemplation appear. Some difficulties, however, and some additional expense would attend the execution of it. Some deviations, therefore, from the principle must be admitted. In the constitution of the judiciary department in particular, it might be inexpedient to insist rigorously on the principle: first, because peculiar qualifications being essential in the members, the primary consideration ought to be to select that mode of choice which best secures these qualifications; secondly, because the permanent tenure by which the appointments are held in that department, must soon destroy all sense of dependence on the authority conferring them. (2)
It is equally evident, that the members of each department should be as little dependent as possible on those of the others, for the emoluments annexed to their offices. Were the executive magistrate, or the judges, not independent of the legislature in this particular, their independence in every other would be merely nominal. (3)
But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. (4)
This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public. We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other -- that the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights. These inventions of prudence cannot be less requisite in the distribution of the supreme powers of the State. (5)
But it is not possible to give to each department an equal power of self-defense. In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will admit. It may even be necessary to guard against dangerous encroachments by still further precautions. As the weight of the legislative authority requires that it should be thus divided, the weakness of the executive may require, on the other hand, that it should be fortified. An absolute negative on the legislature appears, at first view, to be the natural defense with which the executive magistrate should be armed. But perhaps it would be neither altogether safe nor alone sufficient. On ordinary occasions it might not be exerted with the requisite firmness, and on extraordinary occasions it might be perfidiously abused. May not this defect of an absolute negative be supplied by some qualified connection between this weaker department and the weaker branch of the stronger department, by which the latter may be led to support the constitutional rights of the former, without being too much detached from the rights of its own department? (6)
If the principles on which these observations are founded be just, as I persuade myself they are, and they be applied as a criterion to the several State constitutions, and to the federal Constitution it will be found that if the latter does not perfectly correspond with them, the former are infinitely less able to bear such a test. (7)
There are, moreover, two considerations particularly applicable to the federal system of America, which place that system in a very interesting point of view. (8)
First. In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted to the administration of a single government; and the usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government into distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself. (9)
Second. It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure. There are but two methods of providing against this evil: the one by creating a will in the community independent of the majority -- that is, of the society itself; the other, by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable. The first method prevails in all governments possessing an hereditary or self-appointed authority. This, at best, is but a precarious security; because a power independent of the society may as well espouse the unjust views of the major, as the rightful interests of the minor party, and may possibly be turned against both parties. The second method will be exemplified in the federal republic of the US. (10)
Whilst all authority in it will be derived from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority. In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in both cases will depend on the number of interests and sects; and this may be presumed to depend on the extent of country and number of people comprehended under the same government. This view of the subject must particularly recommend a proper federal system to all the sincere and considerate friends of republican government, since it shows that in exact proportion as the territory of the Union may be formed into more circumscribed Confederacies, or States oppressive combinations of a majority will be facilitated: the best security, under the republican forms, for the rights of every class of citizens, will be diminished: and consequently the stability and independence of some member of the government, the only other security, must be proportionately increased. Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit. In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger; and as, in the latter state, even the stronger individuals are prompted, by the uncertainty of their condition, to submit to a government which may protect the weak as well as themselves; so, in the former state, will the more powerful factions or parties be gradnally induced, by a like motive, to wish for a government which will protect all parties, the weaker as well as the more powerful. It can be little doubted that if the State of Rhode Island was separated from the Confederacy and left to itself, the insecurity of rights under the popular form of government within such narrow limits would be displayed by such reiterated oppressions of factious majorities that some power altogether independent of the people would soon be called for by the voice of the very factions whose misrule had proved the necessity of it. In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties, and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and the general good; whilst there being thus less danger to a minor from the will of a major party, there must be less pretext, also, to provide for the security of the former, by introducing into the government a will not dependent on the latter, or, in other words, a will independent of the society itself. It is no less certain than it is important, notwithstanding the contrary opinions which have been entertained, that the larger the society, provided it lie within a practical sphere, the more duly capable it will be of self-government. And happily for the republican cause, the practicable sphere may be carried to a very great extent, by a judicious modification and mixture of the federal principle. (11)
PUBLIUS
READING GUIDE FOR FEDERALIST #51
1. What is essential to the “preservation of liberty?” How should this “be so constituted?”
2. Explain the following: “A dependence upon the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.”
3. In a republican government, which branch is the strongest? Identify three ways of “remedying this inconveniency.”
4. List two ways in which the federal system of the US “places that system in a very interesting point of view,” i.e. protects against tyranny.
*** Make sure that you know the role of the following “auxiliary precautions” in guarding against tyranny:
• Separation of powers
• Checks and balances
• Federalism
Monday, September 20, 2010
So Happy Its Monday
Hi Class,
Just a reminder to read Sabato to page 23 by tomorrow. The quiz you can find at:
http://www.mtbarclay.com/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/sabato1.3.doc
Sss you tomorrow!
Mr. Barclay
Just a reminder to read Sabato to page 23 by tomorrow. The quiz you can find at:
http://www.mtbarclay.com/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/sabato1.3.doc
Sss you tomorrow!
Mr. Barclay
Saturday, September 18, 2010
Sabato Quiz on Monday!!!
I'll make this short and sweet. On Monday you will be quizzed on Sabato. You should read to page 13 in the textbook. This reading has been posted over the last couple of days on the whiteboard. Your quiz for Monday can be found here: http://www.mtbarclay.com/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/sabatochapter1.2.doc
Have a great weekend. I'm looking forward to the Monterey Jazz Festival. I have tickets for the Next Generation Jazz Orchestra, a national high school Jazz honor band directed by my friend, Mr. Paul Contos. See you on Monday!!!
Have a great weekend. I'm looking forward to the Monterey Jazz Festival. I have tickets for the Next Generation Jazz Orchestra, a national high school Jazz honor band directed by my friend, Mr. Paul Contos. See you on Monday!!!
Tuesday, September 14, 2010
Sabato Quiz and Unit One Tomorrow
Hello Class,
Hopefully the Unit 2 test wasn't too painful. We will be starting Unit 1 tomorrow. In preparation for this, please begin reading Sabato Chapter 1 pages 3-11. The quiz is posted in the workspace at: http://www.mtbarclay.com/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/sabato1.doc See you tomorrow!
Hopefully the Unit 2 test wasn't too painful. We will be starting Unit 1 tomorrow. In preparation for this, please begin reading Sabato Chapter 1 pages 3-11. The quiz is posted in the workspace at: http://www.mtbarclay.com/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/sabato1.doc See you tomorrow!
Thursday, September 9, 2010
So Happy It's Thursday...(Again)
Class,
So, tomorrow we will have a review for our unit two test. This review will cover the multiple choice questions on the test. On Monday we will have a FRQ/finish up assignment day in preparation for Tuesday's test. By the way, the next FRQ related to campaign finance can be found here: http://apcentral.collegeboard.com/apc/members/repository/govpol_us_00.pdf
If you search around you will also find the answer key and a "model" student responses. These resources may be useful if you find yourself "stuck."
A couple of possible blog topics include your responses related to the situation at Hartnell: How would you respond to "Pancho Villa's" statements about (1) high numbers of Latinos who attend Hartnell College (2) that Mexican-Americans salute both flags (US and Mexican) and that Arizona's anti-immigrant laws should be adopted in Salinas...
If you want something else to write about, how about the situation regarding the Protestant pastor with plans to burn the Koran on September 11th? Does he have the right to do this? Should he do this? What should the US government (if anything)do to "persuade" this gentleman to cease and desist on his idea. Do you think American lives are potentially at stake over this matter?
See you tomorrow!
MTB
So, tomorrow we will have a review for our unit two test. This review will cover the multiple choice questions on the test. On Monday we will have a FRQ/finish up assignment day in preparation for Tuesday's test. By the way, the next FRQ related to campaign finance can be found here: http://apcentral.collegeboard.com/apc/members/repository/govpol_us_00.pdf
If you search around you will also find the answer key and a "model" student responses. These resources may be useful if you find yourself "stuck."
A couple of possible blog topics include your responses related to the situation at Hartnell: How would you respond to "Pancho Villa's" statements about (1) high numbers of Latinos who attend Hartnell College (2) that Mexican-Americans salute both flags (US and Mexican) and that Arizona's anti-immigrant laws should be adopted in Salinas...
If you want something else to write about, how about the situation regarding the Protestant pastor with plans to burn the Koran on September 11th? Does he have the right to do this? Should he do this? What should the US government (if anything)do to "persuade" this gentleman to cease and desist on his idea. Do you think American lives are potentially at stake over this matter?
See you tomorrow!
MTB
Wednesday, September 8, 2010
Wednesday Again...
Hi Class,
Tomorrow we will be talking about Campaign Finance Reform as our final lecture for Unit 2. You should be working your way toward completing Chapter 13 in Sabato. The last page of the chapter can be found on page 505. Just a tiny bit left to go...
On Friday, we will be taking the vocabulary test for Unit 2. Following that multiple choice quiz, we will prepare for our unit test which will be given to you on Monday or Tuesday of next week. I have to decide. I think the results might be better if we take the test on Tuesday. We could dedicate Monday to FRQ review....
Anyway, see you tomorrow!
Tomorrow we will be talking about Campaign Finance Reform as our final lecture for Unit 2. You should be working your way toward completing Chapter 13 in Sabato. The last page of the chapter can be found on page 505. Just a tiny bit left to go...
On Friday, we will be taking the vocabulary test for Unit 2. Following that multiple choice quiz, we will prepare for our unit test which will be given to you on Monday or Tuesday of next week. I have to decide. I think the results might be better if we take the test on Tuesday. We could dedicate Monday to FRQ review....
Anyway, see you tomorrow!
Tuesday, September 7, 2010
Tuesday's Post
So, tomorrow we will have a Sabato quiz and I will talk to you about the Electoral College. I also will give you an FRQ for homework. This one will be on the incumbency advantage (what are some of the advantage that the incumbant enjoys) in the House and Senate. You may want to refer back to your notes to get a head start. See you tomorrow!
Monday, September 6, 2010
Sabato Quiz for Wednesday
Hi Class,
Hope you are having a great three-day weekend. Today, we are off to the Boardwalk for what I am sure will be huge crowds and long lines...For Wednesday I have posted the next Sabato quiz to be found: http://www.mtbarclay.com/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/sabatochapter13.4.doc
You will need to have read up to page 497 to be covered. Don't forget to continue working on the lecture note questions as well as study the vocabulary.
See you tomorrow!
Mr. Barclay
Hope you are having a great three-day weekend. Today, we are off to the Boardwalk for what I am sure will be huge crowds and long lines...For Wednesday I have posted the next Sabato quiz to be found: http://www.mtbarclay.com/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/sabatochapter13.4.doc
You will need to have read up to page 497 to be covered. Don't forget to continue working on the lecture note questions as well as study the vocabulary.
See you tomorrow!
Mr. Barclay
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